Vendoo is a legitimate crossposting SaaS ([domain withheld]) and the three JS files available show behavior fully consistent with the stated purpose: content scripts on marketplace pages (Depop, eBay, etc.) relay listing data back to the Vendoo web app via chrome.runtime.sendMessage, and tabs.executeScript is only invoked on [domain withheld]-matching tabs to prompt users to reload after an extension update. No chrome.webRequest.addListener calls exist in any extracted file despite being declared, and no network requests to domains outside the disclosed marketplace list were found. The ML score is driven by broad host_permissions, standard Webpack bundle patterns (new Function('return this')() for the global object, fromCharCode in HTML-entity libraries), and high counts from rendering. One real discrepancy exists: the bundled manifest is missing three host permissions present in the live CWS listing (*://*.[domain withheld], *://*.[domain withheld], *://*.[domain withheld]), consistent with the CWS listing being a newer version than the analyzed ZIP; this is expected for a extension and is not itself evidence of malice. Only 4 of ~19 JS files were available for review, lowering confidence.