The extension's purpose—automating single sign‑on via native messaging and web request interception—justifies its critical permissions (webRequest, webRequestBlocking, nativeMessaging, <all_urls>). The provided non‑minified helper files show only expected SSO scaffolding (e.g., webRequest.onAuthRequired handler) with no malicious code, unauthorized data exfiltration, or obfuscation beyond standard minification. The publisher (Micro) is a trusted enterprise with a valid privacy policy, and the CWS‑disclosed data collection (PII, authentication info, website content) matches the extension’s functionality. The manifest version mismatch between the bundled MV2 zip and the live MV3 listing is likely a versioning artefact, not evidence of malice. The ML model’s low risk score (0.05) and the absence of harmful code patterns in the reviewed files support a false‑positive determination.