All first-party code is a plain new-tab wallpaper page: draws a clock, renders localStorage-backed shortcuts, plays the bundled, and routes the search box through chrome.search.query (:104) with no hardcoded engine or redirect target — which is exactly what separates it from the search-hijackers driving the 33% malware rate in its permhash cluster. There is no, no remote script, no content script, no host permission and no POST anywhere; the only outbound destinations are the publisher's own [domain withheld] (manifest author; UTM-tagged pages carrying no user data,:4 and:14), Google Fonts and Google's s2 favicon service. Chrome-stats ( impact, likelihood), the trusted-publisher badge and our own risk-engine score contradict the ML verdict; only the permhash cluster rate and the malext-feed label corroborate it, and the feed note itself states it was an unverified bulk import with no affected version. Confidence is medium rather than high solely because — ~87 KB of the reported 99.4 KB total_js_size — is excluded by name via code_extract.py SKIP_PATTERNS rather than verified by hash, so it was not supplied for review. Two hygiene notes that are not findings::19-25 wipes every IndexedDB database, but runs in the MV3 service worker so it only reaches the extension's own chrome-extension:// origin and cannot touch site storage; and createShortcuts interpolates user-entered into an innerHTML template (:290), a self-XSS limited to the user's own new tab.