This is a white-labeled build of the ChatCenter WhatsApp-Web CRM: (lines 1-90) injects only local files via chrome.runtime.getURL, is unmodified open-source WPPConnect WA-JS, and the sole backend is [domain withheld] ( socketUrl, SocketService.URL_API) reached with the CRM's own bearer token from localStorage 'token-extension-chatcenter' — no WhatsApp session material (no anywhere), no remote code loading, no eval of server data. I cross-checked the full 215-file package ( plus all assets/ chunks) from local CRX storage because the supplied bundle contained only 12 of them; the supplied manifest,,,, and are byte-identical to that build, and the server-driven message dispatcher in handles exclusively CRM domain events (create_channel_card, update_funnel, replaceQuickMessages, update_transmission_job, bot) — i.e. the advertised multi-attendant CRM, flows and broadcast features, not injection or data export. The chrome-stats score (, trusted publisher) and the bundled-vs-published manifest match (storage+tabs, no host_permissions either side) corroborate benign; contradicting signals are the ML score, the 19%-malware permhash cluster (a 32k-member storage+tabs cluster, far too generic to carry weight) and the 'publisher flagged malicious' flag, which can only derive from the same 2026-09-13 malext-feed row whose own basis text says it is 'not an independent code review' and supplies no affected version — the extension is still live and was updated 4 days ago. Hygiene issues worth noting but not findings: any script on [domain withheld] can drive the main-world bridges — the 'getData' fetch proxy and 'chromeStorage' read/write/delete on arbitrary keys ( onMessage), and socketMessage type 'url_base' which repoints the socket (); also carries a dev leftover ('__CC_OPEN_EDITOR__') that GETs [domain withheld]> Without host_permissions the service-worker proxy is still CORS-bound, so it grants the page no new reach. Also: the bundled manifest declares web_accessible_resources 'chunks/*.js' and 'assets/*.html' that do not exist in the package (stale globs), and chat content almost certainly syncs to the CRM while the CWS disclosure lists only 'Personally identifiable information' — a disclosure-completeness gap, not evidence of covert collection.