What our analysis found

Hchat is rated caution by Extension Auditor. Our code review reported 1 finding (1 medium), led by unauthorized data collection. It comes from a publisher with 20 extensions and was last updated in September 2026.

Key findings

• medium· unauthorized data collection —The same port handler is bound to both onConnect and onConnectExternal, so any page on the three vendor-controlled externally_connectable origins (,,) can open a port and post {channel:'WPP', model:'WPP', type, sender}. O() at:445-473 routes that to the port named 'WPP', which:4296 registers from inside the WhatsApp Web page, and its dispatcher at lines 5769-5812 executes the named command and chunks the JSON result back to whatever port name the caller supplied as 'sender'. That round trip lets a vendor web page read the user's WhatsApp messages, contacts, group membership and media (getMessages, getAllUnreadMessages, getContatosGrupos, downloadMedia) and send messages as them; is neither the publisher's own domain () nor a well-known SaaS, and the CWS listing declares no data collection at all. The external listener at:5737-5739 checks only model==='WPP' before reassembling and dispatching, with no origin or credential guard.

What keeps this above benign is concrete::23-42 hardcodes name 'watidy', cript_key ffce211a-7b07-4d91-ba5d-c40bb4034a83 and the backend-plugin / backend-utils / audio-transcriber / multi-atendimento / api-whatsapp hosts that the malext WaSteal report names as that network's shared infrastructure, and:482-502 binds the same port hub to onConnectExternal so vendor pages can drive the full WhatsApp API in the user's session against a CWS disclosure of 'none declared' (:5737-5739 gates that listener on model==='WPP' alone, with no origin, sender or token check). Much of what drove the ML score of 1.00 contradicts malice, though: the 808 KB of flagged entropy is apparently unmodified wppconnect wa-js v4.6.1-alpha.0 (:1, whose only non-WhatsApp hosts are the upstream linkPreview defaults at line 17943 and WhatsApp's own bundled GA Tracker at 14277), the atob hit in:1-7 is an XLSX download helper, the 'inject-code' handler D() at:383-394 reads remote_code but never fetches or executes it, and the pulled from is a DOM-selector map whose bundled twin at:3855+ holds only querySelector-family entries; the 96%-malicious permhash cluster is also weak here since is a generic set. I partly contradict the WaSteal report too - its 'audio interception endpoint' is, in the full CRX on disk, a send-path transcoder that returns early when the clip is already opus, and neither build contains its / injection hosts or the GTM container - and I must flag that the bundle held only 9 of 386 files (~1 MB of 11.3 MB), omitting every app chunk, so this is not a full clearance.