The entire extension is 5 code files implementing exactly one behaviour: a user-toggled SOCKS5 proxy to [domain withheld] (:24-49), off by default (onInstalled writes false), cleared on disable, with a popup that renders static branding. A grep across all finds no fetch, XHR, WebSocket, eval, atob, dynamic import or any remote url()/@import in, so there is no exfiltration channel and no residential-proxy relay, and there are no content scripts, host_permissions, webRequest or tabs hooks, so it cannot read or inject into pages. The bundled manifest matches the published one exactly (MV3, proxy+storage), the publisher is malicious, and the contradicting signals are weak: chrome-stats cites permission-clipboard which this extension does not request and a 'recent month' update on a 181-day-old listing, the 39% permhash cluster is the generic proxy+storage bucket every simple VPN lands in, and the malext-feed note self-describes as an unverified bulk import. Residual risk (not a code finding): all non-local traffic is routed to an unauthenticated third-party SOCKS5 endpoint whose operator can observe destination hosts and plaintext HTTP, and the CWS 'none declared' disclosure understates that for a proxy product - which is why this is likely_benign rather than a clean false_positive.