The three JavaScript files in the bundle implement exactly what the listing describes: seeds chrome.storage.local defaults and relays three message types, rasterizes a bundled to a data: URL via canvas.toDataURL() (:61-74) and stores it, and injects a single <style> element setting `cursor: url(<data-uri>)` (:20-34). There is no fetch, XMLHttpRequest, eval, Function(), chrome.tabs content reading, cookie access, webRequest, or any outbound network call in any reviewed file; the only permission is `storage`, and the bundled manifest matches the published manifest summary exactly (permissions `[storage]`, MV3, web_accessible_resources `cur/*.*` on `*://*/*`). The Unit42 IoC listing and the 10%-malicious permhash cluster contradict the code, but the only adware-shaped behaviour present is a forced install tab and an uninstall URL to [domain withheld] (:16-18, 23-25), which is the publisher's own website - whatever earned the IoC entry would live on that landing page, not in this package. I withhold `false_positive` only because jquery. is listed in (and loaded at:8 and) but was not supplied in the extraction, so ~90 KB of popup-scope library code went unreviewed.