Every network destination in the reviewed code is first-party or the shop the extension exists to query: [domain withheld] (publisher domain, matching the CWS privacy-policy host) for,,, and (:8006, 9411), [domain withheld] page fetches, Firebase FCM for the disclosed price-change notifications (:~4030,), and [domain withheld] using a key the user stores themselves (:8872). There is no Function, no dynamic <script> element, no chrome.cookies, webRequest, declarativeNetRequest, sendBeacon, password-field or keystroke access anywhere in the 20 files, and the affiliate wrapping ([domain withheld] user_id=1063 at:3352 and:7651) fires only on an explicit user click or context-menu action, with a one-time shown at install (:8936) — user-initiated and disclosed, not cookie stuffing. Contradicting the ML score: chrome-stats claims 'removed-from-store' while the listing is active and was updated 2 days ago, and the permhash cluster of 2 at 100% malware is almost certainly two versions of this same extension, so it is self-referential rather than corroborating. Confidence is capped at medium because the bundle is a MB subset of the real MB package: (the content script covering ~100 patterns),,, and the pages were not provided, so I could not audit the page-scraping code itself. Hygiene notes only: the bundled manifest drops the live listing's gcm permission and the [domain withheld] development host, adds optional_host_permissions of <all_urls> plus the two DeepL hosts (optional, user-granted, consistent with user-added shopping sites and the translate feature), and places scripting in optional_permissions rather than permissions as the prompt's summary states — the bundled set is narrower than the published one, not an escalation;:2559 correctly pins event.source===window and the origin allowlist before relaying.