Calm Tab

The server at calmtab.blackblocks.co can return any `redirect` URL in the session-check response and the extension will unconditionally navigate the current tab to it via `chrome.tabs.update`. This is a concrete server-controlled navigation primitive: if the operator decides to push a phishing URL or malicious page, every installed user is silently redirected with no user prompt or confirmation.

} else if (data.redirect) {  // They logged in but they didn't pay  chrome.tabs.update({    url: data.redirect  })} else {

The extension prompts for and POSTs the user's email address to the developer's server, then stores the returned JWT in `chrome.storage.sync` (which syncs across all Chrome profiles on all devices). Combined with the publisher's 100% malicious extension rate for their other published extensions, this email-collection-to-server-controlled-auth pipeline warrants scrutiny even if no immediate misuse is visible in the code.

let email = document.getElementById('email')  .valuefetch('https://calmtab.blackblocks.co/login', {    method: 'POST',    mode: 'cors',    body: JSON.stringify({      email: email    }),    headers: {      'Content-type': 'application/json; charset=UTF-8',    }  })  .then(response => response.json())  .then((data) => {      document.getElementById('loading-login')        .classList.add("d-none")      if (data) {        if (data.token) {          // Saving token for later use          chrome.storage.sync.set({            calm_jwt: data.token          })

The extension declares `*://*/*` host permissions, but the only external endpoints actually used in the code are `https://calmtab.blackblocks.co/login` and `https://calmtab.blackblocks.co/session`. The over-broad declaration grants the extension the right to make cross-origin fetch requests to any URL on the internet, far exceeding what the stated functionality requires and providing headroom for future server-directed data exfiltration without a permissions update.

{  "host_permissions": [    "*://*/*"  ]}