The complete package is a cursor-skinning extension::20-34 builds one <style> element whose only content is `cursor: url(<data-URI>)` rules from a canvas-rendered.cur file (:61-74), only seeds chrome.storage.local defaults and the publisher's own [domain withheld] landing page on, and the 4th JS file (jquery., absent from the extracted bundle) was pulled from the stored CRX at /[domain withheld] and is byte-for-byte stock jQuery 3.6.0 (89,501 bytes, zero URLs, zero chrome.* API references). There is no, no eval or Function constructor, no remote code, no access anywhere in the package, and the bundled manifest (storage only, MV3, content script *://*/* at document_start, web_accessible_resources cur/*.*) matches the published manifest exactly. The Unit42 IoC listing and the ML score are the only signals pointing to malice; the third-party chrome-stats impact of, our own Low risk-engine verdict, and malicious siblings for publisher live4kwallpaper all contradict them, and the code contains no ad injection, redirect, or affiliate-tag behaviour that an classification would require — whatever Unit42 observed would have to live in the content of the [domain withheld] landing page, which static review of this ZIP cannot reach.