The v1.0.5 bundle is a self-contained cursor-theming extension with zero network capability: the only fetch in the whole package is fetch(" ") (:20,) against a bundled file, and the only external host anywhere in the code is [domain withheld], which matches the manifest's homepage_url (:7). injects nothing but a <style> element carrying cursor: url(data:...) rules built from canvas.toDataURL() output of bundled PNGs (:45), so the broad host permissions and the scripting call are exactly what the stated function requires. The bundled manifest matches the published CWS manifest on permissions, host_permissions, content_scripts and web_accessible_resources, so there is no delayed-update mismatch. Contradicting signals that the code does not corroborate: the Unit42 IoC listing (added 2025-08-19, predating this build, which was last updated ~106 days ago), the publisher-level malicious flag, and malicious siblings; the only PUP-flavoured behaviour actually present is self-promotion (:54 setUninstallURL, opens a UTM-tagged [domain withheld] page on install, -109 reloads open [domain withheld] tabs on every service-worker start) — annoying and marketing-driven, but not adware injection, redirection or data collection. I hold at likely_benign rather than false_positive because the 310 KB React popup bundle was grep-audited rather than read line by line, and because a publisher with this record could ship a malicious later version.